Abstract. We consider profit maximization pricing problems, where we are given a set of m customers and a set of n items. Each customer c is associated with a subset Sc ⊆ [n] of items of interest, together with a budget Bc, and we assume that there is an unlimited supply of each item. Once the prices are fixed for all items, each customer c buys a subset of items in Sc, according to its buying rule. The goal is to set the item prices so as to maximize the total profit. We study the unit-demand min-buying pricing (UDP MIN ) and the singleminded pricing (SMP) problems. In the former problem, each customer c buys the cheapest item i ∈ Sc, if its price is no higher than the budget Bc, and buys nothing otherwise. In the latter problem, each customer c buys the whole set Sc if its total price is at most Bc, and buys nothing otherwise. Both problems are known to admit O(min {log(m + n), n})-approximation algorithms. We prove that they are log 1− (m + n) hard to approximate for any constant , unless NP ⊆ DTIME(n log δ n ), where δ is a constant depending on . Restricting our attention to approximation factors depending only on n, we show that these problems are 2 log 1−δ nhard to approximate for any δ > 0 unless NP ⊆ ZPTIME(n log δ n ), where δ is some constant depending on δ. We also prove that restricted versions of UDP MIN and SMP, where the sizes of the sets Sc are bounded by k, are k 1/2− -hard to approximate for any constant . We then turn to the Tollbooth Pricing problem, a special case of SMP, where each item corresponds to an edge in the input graph, and each set
Introduction
We study profit maximization pricing problems in the unlimited supply model. In these problems, we are given a set of m customers and a set of n items, where each customer c is associated with a budget B c , and a subset S c ⊆ [n] of items it is interested in. Our goal is to set a price p(i) for each item i ∈ [n], so as to maximize the total revenue. Once the prices for the items are set, each customer c chooses a subset of items in S c to buy, using its buying rule. We assume that we are given an unlimited supply of each item.
One of the most natural buying rules is the unit-demand min-buying rule, where each customer c ∈ [m] buys the cheapest item i ∈ S c (breaking ties arbitrarily), provided that the price p(i) ≤ B c . We refer to the corresponding pricing problem as UDP MIN . This problem was first introduced by Rusmevichientong et al. [18, 19] , and subsequently Aggarwal et al. [1] have shown an O(log m + log n)-approximation algorithm for it.
The second problem that we consider is Single-Minded Pricing (SMP). Here, each customer c buys the whole set S c of items if its total price does not exceed its budget B c , and buys nothing otherwise. This problem was introduced by Guruswami et al. [14] , who also show that the techniques of [1] can be used to obtain an O(log m + log n)-approximation algorithm for SMP. Hartline and Koltun [15] gave a (1 + )-approximation algorithm for both UDP MIN and SMP when the number of items n is constant.
We remark that for pricing problems, it is natural to assume that the number of customers is much higher than the number of items, that is, m >> n. Even though both UDP MIN and SMP admit logarithmic approximation algorithms in terms of (m + n), if we restrict ourselves to approximation factors depending only on n, nothing better than the trivial O(n)-approximation is known.
On the negative side, Briest [3] has shown that both UDP MIN and SMP are max n δ , log δ (m + n) -hard to approximate for some (small) δ > 0, assuming that no randomized polynomial-time algorithms can approximate constantdegree Balanced Bipartite Independent Set to within arbitrarily small constant factors. He also showed similar results under an assumption that slightly strengthens Feige's Random 3SAT hypothesis [11] .
In this paper, we show that both UDP MIN and SMP are log 1− (m + n) hard to approximate for any constant , unless NP ⊆ DTIME(n log n ) for some constant depending only on . If we restrict our attention to approximation factors as a function of n, then we show that both these problems are 2 log 1−δ n hard to approximate for any constant δ, under the assumption that NP ⊆ ZPTIME(n log δ n ), for some constant δ depending only on δ.
We next turn to restricted versions of UDP MIN and SMP, denoted by kUDP MIN and kSMP respectively, where the sizes of the sets S c are bounded by k. The kSMP problem is known to be APX-hard even for k = 2 [14] , and Balcan and Blum [2] have shown an O(k)-approximation for kUDP MIN , improving on an independent work of Briest and Krysta [4] , who achieved an O(k 2 )-approximation for the problem. As for negative results, Briest [3] has proved that kSMP is k -hard to approximate for some constant , assuming Feige's random 3SAT hypothesis [11] , and Khandekar et al. [16] showed that the problem is Ω(k) hard to approximate for constant k, assuming the Unique Games Conjecture of Khot [17] . We show that both kUDP MIN and kSMP are k 1/2− -hard to approximate for any constant unless P = NP.
Finally, we consider a special case of the SMP problem called the Tollbooth Pricing problem, where we are given a graph G, and items correspond to the edges of G. The item set S c of every customer c is some simple path in graph G, and the goal is to set the prices of the edges, so as to maximize the revenue. Since the Tollbooth Pricing problem is a special case of SMP, it admits an O(log m + log n) approximation [14] . The problem is APX-hard [14] , and from the results of Khandekar et al. [16] , it is (2 − ) hard to approximate even on star graphs, assuming the Unique Games Conjecture. We show that the Tollbooth Pricing problem is at least as hard to approximate as the Unique Coverage problem (to within a constant factor). In the Unique Coverage problem, we are given a collection U of n elements, and a family S of subsets of elements of U . The goal is to find a family S ⊆ S of element subsets, maximizing the number of elements that are covered by exactly one subset in S . The problem was introduced and studied by Demaine et al. [8] , who showed that for any arbitrarily small constant δ, if NP ⊆ BPTIME(2 n δ ), then Unique Coverage is hard to approximate to within a factor of Ω(log n), where is some constant depending on δ. They also showed that the problem is hard to approximate to within Ω(log 1/3− n) for any assuming the Random 3SAT Hypothesis of Feige [11] , and proved additional hardness results using a hypothesis about Balanced Bipartite Independent Set. Our reduction immediately implies similar hardness results for the Tollbooth Pricing problem.
Related Work. Briest and Krysta [4] considered a more general version of UDP MIN , where customers are allowed to have different budgets (valuations) for different items. They show an Ω(log n)-hardness for this problem for some constant , unless NP ⊆ DTIME n O(log log n) , and an n -hardness for some constant > 0,
A special case of the Tollbooth Pricing problem, called the Highway Problem, where the input graph is restricted to be a path, has received a significant amount of attention. Elbassioni et al. [9] showed that the problem is strongly NP-hard. On the algorithmic side, Balcan and Blum [2] have shown an O(log n)-approximation algorithm, and Elbassioni et al. [10] have proposed a QPTAS. Subsequently, Grandoni and Rothvoss [13] have shown a PTAS for the problem. For the special case of the Tollbooth Pricing problem where the input graph is a tree, the best known approximation ratio is O(log n/ log log n), due to Gamzu and Segev [12] . However, when the number of leaves in the tree is bounded by a constant, the problem admits a PTAS [13] .
Pricing problems with limited supply have also received a considerable amount of attention; Please refer to, e.g., [5, 7, 6] and references therein.
Our Results. We start by formally stating the pricing problems we consider. We are given a set of m customers and a set of n items, where each customer c ∈ [m] is associated with a set S c ⊆ [n] of items and a budget B c . Given a setting {p(i)} i∈[n] of item prices, every customer selects a subset S c ⊆ S c of items to buy according to its buying rule, and our goal is to maximize the total profit,
In the UDP MIN problem, the buying rule of the customers is defined as follows. Each customer c ∈ [m] buys the cheapest item i ∈ S c , breaking ties arbitrarily, if p(i) ≤ B c , and buys nothing otherwise.
In the SMP problem, each customer c ∈ [m] purchases the whole set S c if i∈Sc p(i) ≤ B c , and purchases nothing otherwise. Our main result is summarized in the following theorem. Theorem 1. UDP MIN and SMP are log 1− (m + n)-hard to approximate for any constant > 0, unless NP ⊆ DTIME(n (log n) ), where is some constant depending only on . Moreover, assuming that NP ⊆ ZPTIME(n (log n) δ ), both problems are hard to approximate to within a factor of 2 log 1−δ n for any constant δ, where δ is some constant depending only on δ.
We next turn to special cases of both problems, denoted by kUDP MIN and kSMP respectively, where the sizes of the sets S c are bounded by k and prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let > 0 be any constant. Then for infinitely many constants k, both kUDP MIN and kSMP are k 1/2− -hard to approximate unless P = NP.
Finally we turn to the Tollbooth Pricing problem. In this problem, we are given a graph G = (V, E), and a set of m simple paths P 1 , . . . , P m , where each path P c is associated with a customer c and a budget B c . Once the price function p : E → R on the edges is set, each customer c buys all edges on the path P c if e∈Pc p(e) ≤ B c , and buys nothing otherwise. The goal is to compute the edge prices p(e) so as to maximize the total profit. It is clear that Tollbooth Pricing is a special case of SMP, and notice that the number of items is n = |E(G)|.
We perform a reduction from the Unique Coverage problem to the Tollbooth Pricing. In the Unique Coverage problem, we are given a set U of elements and a family S of subsets of U as input. A solution is a sub-collection S ⊆ S of the input sets. We say that element u ∈ U is satisfied by the solution if and only if it belongs to exactly one set in S . Our goal is to choose S so as to maximize the number of satisfied elements. Demaine et. al. [8] have shown that for any arbitrarily small constant δ, if NP ⊆ BPTIME(2 n δ ), then Unique Coverage is hard to approximate to within a factor of Ω(log n), for some constant depending on δ. They also showed that, under the assumption of Feige [11] that refuting random instances of 3SAT is hard, Unique Coverage is hard to approximate to within a factor of Ω(log 1/3− n) for any > 0. We prove the following theorem:
If there is a factor α-approximation algorithm for the Tollbooth Pricing problem, for any approximation factor α ≤ O(log n), then there is a randomized O(α)-approximation algorithm for the Unique Coverage problem.
Combining this with the result of [8] , we obtain the following corollary.
booth Pricing is hard to approximate to within a factor of Ω(log n) for some constant depending on δ. Moreover, under Feige's random 3SAT assumption, this problem is hard to approximate to within a factor of Ω(log 1/3− n) for any > 0.
Hardness of UDP MIN and SMP
In this section we prove Theorems 1 and 2. We focus here on the UDP MIN problem only. The hardness results for SMP are obtained using similar ideas and appear in the full version of the paper.
We start with the following theorem, due to Trevisan [20] . Since we use slightly different parameters, we provide the proof in the full version.
Theorem 4. Given an n-variable 3SAT formula ϕ, any sufficiently small constant > 0 and any integer λ > 0, there is a randomized algorithm to construct a graph G with maximum degree at most ∆ = 2 λ poly(
-(Yes-Instance:) If ϕ is satisfiable, then G has an independent set of size
The construction size is |V (G)| = n λ poly(
, and the reduction runs in time n λ poly( 1 ) . Moreover, the algorithm can be made deterministic with running time
The Construction
Let G = (V, E) be the instance of Maximum Independent Set obtained from Theorem 4, where the value of λ (and ∆) will be fixed later. We first define an intermediate instance of UDP MIN , which is then converted into a final instance.
The intermediate instance is defined as follows. The set of items contains, for each vertex v ∈ V , for each index y ∈ [∆], an item i(v, y). That is, the set of
Similarly, the set of customers contains, for each vertex v ∈ V , for each index x ∈ [∆], a customer c(v, x). That is, the set of customers is
The item set S c(v,x) for the customer c(v, x), contains the item i(v, x), and additionally, for each neighbor u of vertex v in graph G, for each index
We partition the set C of customers into ∆ subsets C 1 , . . . , C ∆ , such that for each 1 ≤ h ≤ ∆, set C h contains customers c(v, h) for all v ∈ V . Finally, for each 1 ≤ h ≤ ∆, each customer c ∈ C h is assigned budget B c = 1/2
h .
This finishes the definition of the intermediate instance. For convenience, we call the customers in set C virtual customers. In our final instance, we replace each virtual customer with a number of new customers.
In order to define the final instance, for each 1 ≤ h ≤ ∆, we replace each virtual customer c ∈ C h with a set G(c) = c (1) 
, while the number of items isñ = |V | · ∆. Moreover, for each customer c ∈ C , we have |S c | ≤ ∆ 2 + 1. This completes the construction description.
Analysis
We analyze the construction in the following two lemmas. Lemma 1. In the Yes-Instance, there is a solution to the UDP MIN problem instance whose value is at least |V |∆ 1− .
Proof. Let U ⊆ V be a maximum independent set of size |V |/∆ in G. We set the prices of the items i(u, y) ∈ I as follows. If u ∈ U , then the price of i(u, y) is set to ∞. Otherwise, if u ∈ U , then we set the price of i(u, y) to 1/2 y . Notice that, since |U | · ∆ ≥ |V | · ∆ 1− , there are |V | · ∆ 1− items of finite prices. We now show that this solution has value at least |V | · ∆ 1− .
Indeed, for each vertex u ∈ U and an index y ∈ [∆], consider the virtual customer c = c(v, y) ∈ C y . Notice that S c contains item i(v, y) whose price is 1/2 y , but all other items in S c have price ∞. Therefore, each customer c ∈ G(c ) buys the item i(v, y), and pays 1/2 y for it. The total profit collected from customers in G(c ) is 1, and so the total profit collected from all customers is at least |U |∆ ≥ |V | · ∆ 1− .
Lemma 2.
In the No-Instance, the value of the optimal solution is at most
Proof. Let p * be an optimal solution, and let r * be its revenue. We first argue that we can assume w.l.o.g. that for each item i ∈ I , either p
Indeed, suppose there is an item i ∈ I with p * (i) ∈ (1/2 h , 1/2 h−1 ). Then any customer who buys item i must have budget at least 1/2 h−1 , so increasing p * (i) to 1/2 h−1 does not affect these customers, and may only increase the revenue. Therefore, from now on we assume that for each item i ∈ I , p
Notice that for each virtual customer c ∈ C, all customers in G(c) contribute the same amount to the total revenue. Let k c denote this amount. We now let C * ⊆ C be the set of virtual customers for which k c = B c . Equivalently,
Claim. The customers in c ∈C * G(c ) contribute at least r * /2 to the total revenue.
Due to space limitation, the proof of this claim appears in the full version. Notice that |C * | ≥ r * /2, since for each virtual customer c ∈ C * , the total budget of all customers in G(c) is 1.
From now on, we focus on finding an independent set U in graph G of size at least (r * /2 − |V |)/∆ from C * . Since in the No-Instance, G does not contain an independent set of size more than |V |/∆ 1− , this implies that (r * /2 − |V |)/∆ ≤ |V | /∆ 1− , and hence r * ≤ O(|V | ∆ ).
We construct an independent set U ⊆ V (G), together with a partition (C 1 , C 2 ) of C * , as follows. Start with U, C 1 , C 2 = ∅. We then perform ∆ iterations, where in iteration y, we consider each virtual customer c(v, y) in C * ∩ C y , and do the following:
-If vertex v is already in U , we add virtual customer c(v, y) into C 1 . -If vertex v is not in U and U ∪ {v} remains an independent set, we add vertex v to set U and add c(v, y) to C 1 . We say that c(v, y) is responsible for adding vertex v into U . -Otherwise, v ∈ U , but there is a vertex u ∈ U such that (u, v) ∈ E(G). We add c(v, y) to C 2 in this case and say that vertex u prevents the algorithm from adding v into U .
In the end, when all customers in C * are processed, each virtual customer in C * is added to either
Moreover, for each virtual customer c(v, y) in C 1 , the corresponding vertex v belongs to U , so |U | ≥ |C 1 |/∆. The following claim will complete the proof of the lemma.
Claim. |C
2 | ≤ |V |, and so |U | ≥ |C
Proof. It is sufficient to show that for each vertex v ∈ V , no two virtual customers c(v, y), c(v, y ) with y = y belong to C 2 . Assume otherwise, and let c(v, y), c(v, y ) ∈ C 2 . By our construction, we have c(v, y) ∈ C y and c(v, y ) ∈ C y . Assume w.l.o.g. that y < y , so c(v, y) was processed before c(v, y ).
Let u ∈ U be a vertex such that (u, v) ∈ E(G), and vertex u prevents the algorithm from adding v to set U . Let c(u, x) be the customer responsible for adding u to U . Then c(u, x) was processed before c(v, y), and so x ≤ y < y . We first prove Theorem 1. We choose the parameter λ = O(log log n) such that
. Taking logarithm on both sides will give g = log 1−O( ) (m +ñ). The deterministic reduction takes time 2 O(∆) = n (log n) f ( ) for some function f , so we have proved the first part of Theorem 1.
To prove the second part, we use the randomized version of Theorem 4, and choose λ = (log n) b for some large constant b, while is set to be any small enough constant for which Theorem 4 works. In this case, we have ∆ = 2 O((log n)
Since we use the randomized reduction, the running time of the reduction is 2
, and so the result holds under the assumption that NP ⊆ ZPTIME(n (log n)
To prove Theorem 2, we choose λ in Theorem 4 to be any sufficiently large constant. Denote by k = max c∈C |S c |. Since the construction guarantees that k ≤ 2∆ 2 , we have the hardness factor of ∆ 1−2 ≥ k 1/2− . In this case, the deterministic reduction only takes polynomial time, so this hardness result holds under the assumption that P = NP.
Tollbooth Pricing
In this section we prove Theorem 3. It will be useful to introduce the notion of fractional coverage and show how to convert fractional coverage to an integral one. Given an instance of Unique Coverage and a fractional solution that assigns a non-negative weight w(S) to every set S ∈ S, we say that an element u ∈ U is fractionally covered if and only if 1/4 ≤ S:u∈S w(S) ≤ 1. We argue that any good fractional coverage can be converted into a good integral coverage with a constant loss in the solution value. The proof of the following lemma appears in the full version of the paper.
Lemma 3.
There is an efficient randomized algorithm, that, given a fractional solution of value βn to any instance of the Unique Coverage problem, w.h.p. finds an integral solution of value Ω(βn) to the Unique Coverage instance.
Construction
Let (U, S) be an instance of Unique Coverage, where |U | = n and |S| = m. We construct an instance of Tollbooth Pricing as follows. Graph G = (V, E) consists of m + 1 vertices v 0 , . . . , v m . Let h = log m . For each consecutive pair (v i−1 , v i ) of vertices, 0 < i ≤ m, we add h + 1 parallel edges e i 0 , . . . , e i h . These edges are viewed as representing the set S i ∈ S. We now define the set of paths (or customers) in the graph. All paths start from v 0 and end at v m . For each element u ∈ U , for each j : 1 ≤ j ≤ h, we have a set P(u, j) of 2 h−j paths. The budget of each path in P(u, j) is 2 j , the source vertex is v 0 , and the sink is v m . Each path in P(u, j) consists of edges e h . Letm andñ denote the number of customers (i.e. the number of paths) and items, respectively. Notice thatm ≤ O(nm log m), andñ ≤ nh ≤ O(n log m) ≤ O(n 2 ), since we can assume w.l.o.g. that |S| ≤ 2 n .
Analysis
The analysis consists of two parts. First we show that if there is a solution to Unique Coverage that satisfies a β-fraction of the elements, then there is a solution to Tollbooth Pricing of value at least β · B. In the second part, we show an efficient randomized algorithm, that, given any solution to Tollbooth Pricing instance G of value α · B, w.h.p. finds a solution to the Unique Coverage problem that satisfies Ω(αn) elements.
Lemma 4.
If there is a solution to the Unique Coverage instance (U, S) that satisfies at least βn-elements, then there is a solution to the Tollbooth Pricing instance of value βB.
Proof. Let S ⊆ S be a solution to the Unique Coverage problem, and let U ⊆ U be the set of elements uniquely covered by S , |U | ≥ βn. For each S i ∈ S , for each j : 1 ≤ j ≤ h, we set the price of the edge e i j to 2 j . The prices of all other edges (including the edges e i 0 for all i) are set to 0. For each u ∈ U and j : 1 ≤ j ≤ h, we consider the revenue collected from the paths in P(u, j). Let S i be the set that uniquely covers u in the solution. Then for each path in P(u, j), exactly one edge e i j on the path has a non-zero price. This price is 2 j -the same as the budget of the path, while all other edges have price 0. Therefore, each such path contributes 2 j to the solution value, and the total contribution of the paths in P(u, j) is 2
h . This implies the lemma.
Lemma 5.
There is an efficient randomized algorithm, that, given any solution to the Tollbooth Pricing instance G of value αB, w.h.p. finds a solution to the Unique Coverage instance (U, S) that satisfies Ω(αn) of the elements.
Proof. Let p * : E → R ≥0 be any solution of value αB to the Tollbooth Pricing problem. Let P 1 be the set of paths, such that each P ∈ P 1 contributes at least half of its budget to the solution. Our first observation is that the profit collected from the paths in P 1 must be at least αB/2 (otherwise, we can multiply the price of each edge by a factor of two and get a better solution). From now on, we will only focus on paths in P 1 and we will discard all other paths. We say that a path P ∈ P 1 is of type 1 if at least half the cost it pays goes to edges in set E 0 = e i 0 : 1 ≤ i ≤ m , and it is of type 2 otherwise. Let P and P denote the set of paths of type 1 and 2 respectively. We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: Paths of type 1 contribute at least αB/4 to the solution value. We claim that in this case the solution value is at most O(B/ log m), and therefore it is sufficient to find a solution to Unique Coverage instance that satisfies a Ω(1/ log m)-fraction of the elements. We then show an algorithm to find such a solution.
Indeed, consider some element u ∈ U . Recall that, for all j, every path in the sets P(u, j) traverses all edges in the set E 0 (u) = e i 0 : u ∈ S i , and these are the only edges from E 0 traversed by these paths. Let C u = e∈E0(u) p * (e) be the total price of these edges. A path P ∈ P(u, j) can belong to P only if 2 j /4 ≤ C u ≤ 2 j . This means that there are at most 3 values of j : 1 ≤ j ≤ h for which P(u, j) ∩ P = ∅, so for each u ∈ U , the paths in set h j=1 P(u, j) only contribute at most an O(1/h) = O(1/ log m)-fraction of their total budget to the solution. Therefore, the solution value is at most O(B/h) = O(B/ log m). Now we show an algorithm for the Unique Coverage problem instance that satisfies an Ω(1/ log m)-fraction of the elements. From Lemma 3, it is enough to construct a fractional solution of value Ω(n/ log m). For each element u ∈ U , let δ(u) be the number of sets in S to which element u belongs. We partition the elements into h = log m classes C 1 , . . . , C h where class C j contains elements u with 2 j ≤ δ(u) ≤ 2 j+1 . Let j * be the class containing the maximum number of elements, so |C j * | ≥ Ω(n/ log m). We set the weight of every set S to be w(S) = 1/2 j * +1 . This ensures that all elements in C j * are fractionally covered. Applying Lemma 3, we obtain an integral solution of value Ω(n/ log m).
Case 2: Assume now that the paths in P contribute at least αB/4 to the solution value. Let r denote the total revenue collected from these paths by edges in E 1 = E \ E 0 . Then we have that r ≥ Ω(αB) = Ω(αnh2 h ). Notice that by the definition of set P , each path P ∈ P pays at least 1/4 of its budget for the edges in set E 1 that lie on path P .
We now partition the paths in P into sets P 1 , . . . , P h where set P j contains all type-2 paths whose budget is 2 j . Let j * be the index for which the profit contributed by the paths in P j * is maximized. This profit is at least αn2 h .
We say that element u is good if 2 j * /4 ≤ i:u∈Si p * (e i j * ) ≤ 2 j * . From the above arguments, for each path P ∈ P , if P ∈ P(u, j * ), then the corresponding element u must be good. Moreover, if u is good, then all paths in P(u, j * ) belong to P j * . Therefore, at least Ω(αn) of the elements in U must be good. We now define a fractional solution to the Unique Coverage problem, where every the weight of every set S i ∈ S is set to w(S i ) = p(e i j * )/2 j * . Notice that all good elements are fractionally covered, thus giving us a fractional solution where Ω(αn) elements are satisfied. We finally invoke Lemma 3 to complete the proof.
